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THE DEVELOPING EQUALITY 
JURISPRUDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Karthy Govender* †
Apartheid was technically about separateness, but it was fundamentally 
about inequality. The founding premise of the ideology was to preserve the 
total hegemony of white South Africans. The liberation organizations op-
posing the apartheid regime sought to affirm that the country belonged to all 
those that lived in it. Thus, it is unsurprising that the commitment to equality 
is one of the founding values of the Constitution and an indelible thread 
woven throughout the fabric of the Bill of Rights. After some misstatements 
about certain rights being more important than others, courts have inter-
preted rights in the Bill of Rights to be of equal worth. However, the 
centrality of the right to equality cannot be gainsaid.  
I. The Developing Jurisprudence 
Over the last fourteen years, the courts have incrementally developed 
their equality jurisprudence. The drafters of the South African Constitution 
had the immodest directive of drafting a bill of rights that protected and en-
trenched all universally accepted fundamental rights and freedoms. Thus, 
different visions were fused into the Bill of Rights. A constraining vision 
prevented state action that unreasonably and unjustifiably infringed rights, 
while an egalitarian vision compelled calculated and measured steps by the 
state towards the attainment of a fairer and more compassionate society.  
When the process of interpreting the Constitution started, it was uncer-
tain which vehicle would best achieve the object of improving the quality of 
life of all persons. Hence, it was eminently prudent to allow each right to 
develop incrementally, rather than to engage prematurely in an expansive 
reflection that could have retarded the development of more relevant and 
directly applicable rights. With the growth, development, and interpretation 
of all of these rights, the vista became clearer, making an expansive devel-
opment of principles appropriate. Apartheid unfairly discriminated based on 
immutable characteristics and undermined human dignity. The need to re-
pair and remedy this became inherent in the interpretation of the right to 
equality.  
The first decisions interpreting the right to equality involved a curious 
assortment of litigants—persons unhappy with presumptions of negligence 
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Differentiation that amounts to discrimination is regulated by sec-
tion 9(3) of the Constitution. Section 9(3) prohibits unfair discrimination 
based on race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
color, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language, and birth (this list is not exhaustive). The listed grounds represent 
past ways people have been marginalized and oppressed, and courts hold, 
per section 9(5), that differentiation on any one of them amounts to a pre-
sumption of discrimination. The party differentiating on a listed ground 
in the Forests Act; an insolvent German fugitive seeking to prevent property 
in his wife’s name being presumed to be purchased by the insolvent; and a 
convicted South African male endeavouring to be included in a general par-
don for female prisoners with minor children. Out of these cases, a working 
formula emerged to interpret the right to equality—section 9 of the Consti-
tution, the first substantive right in the Bill of Rights.  
II. Interpretation of Section 9 
Section 9(1) affirms the right to the equal protection and benefit of the 
law. However, section 9(3), the right not to be subject to unfair discrimina-
tion on the basis of listed and analogous grounds, is the centerpiece of the 
developing equality jurisprudence. Courts protect substantive equality and 
endorse affirmative measures to achieve it by defining equality to include 
the full, equal enjoyment of rights. The right not to be subject to unfair dis-
crimination is also binding on private and juristic persons, and the 
Promotion of Equality Act and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 
2000 gives legislative effect to this right. Finally, in order to reduce the de-
manding burden of proof that plagues applicants in other equality 
jurisdictions, there is a constitutional presumption that discrimination on 
one of the listed grounds is unfair unless a defendant establishes the con-
trary.  
Differentiation is objectionable if it imposes burdens or grants benefits 
on the basis of categorizations that adversely impact the dignity of the com-
plainant. Thus, equality jurisprudence distinguishes categorizations that 
impact dignity from those that do not. Courts interpret section 9(1) to mean 
that state differentiation is permissible if the categorization is rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state objective. Section 9(1) does not require the state to 
satisfy a more exacting standard of reasonableness. Courts see the imposi-
tion of burdens on some and benefits on others as integral to the process of 
governance. Provided that these differentiations do not adversely impact 
dignity and amount to discrimination, courts are content to subject them to 
non-exacting rationality review and afford a significant measure of latitude 
to the government. Given the relative ease with which the state can justify 
its actions under section 9(1), successful constitutional challenges using this 
section are unusual. This is an appropriate judicial interpretation, as requir-
ing a developing state to establish the reasonableness of every economic 
choice and decision while operating within the discipline of an expansive 
constitution would be unduly burdensome. 
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must prove that the differentiation is fair and provide an explanation for its 
decision.  
In addition to the listed grounds, differentiation on analogous grounds 
(immutable characteristics that have the potential to impact adversely on 
human dignity) may also be constitutionally illegitimate. Examples of such 
grounds include citizenship and HIV status. In contrast to the listed grounds 
of differentiation, the presumption of unfairness does not operate with 
analogous grounds. The complainant must prove that the ground on which 
the differentiation occurs qualifies as an analogous ground and that the dis-
crimination is unfair.  
III. The Unfairness Standard 
Unfairness has become the main area of contention in discrimination 
matters as a result of the way courts have interpreted the constitutional right 
to equality.  
In determining whether discrimination is unfair, courts look at the im-
pact the discrimination has on the complainant. Specifically, courts examine 
whether the complainant belongs to a category of persons that were victims 
of past patterns of discrimination, whether the measure impairs the dignity 
of the complainant, and whether the measure is designed to achieve a laud-
able and important societal objective. The investigation of whether a 
measure perpetuates systematic and entrenched patterns of discrimination 
and the assessment of its impact on the complainant are often set against the 
laudable social objective of the measure. For example, in the early decision 
of President of South Africa v. Hugo, the presidential decision to discrimi-
nate against men by pardoning and releasing women from prison who had 
children under the age of twelve was motivated by a genuine desire to assist 
those women’s children. In fashioning a test, the Court noted the impact on 
the complainant, but could not ignore the true purpose of the measure.  
In City Council of Pretoria v. Walker, the Court considered the right to 
be treated the same, the meaning of equality, and the constitutional impera-
tives of improving the quality of life. The residents of the predominantly 
white part of Pretoria were charged a consumption-based tariff, while resi-
dents of the African townships were charged a flat rate per household. The 
flat rate was significantly lower than the consumption-based tariff. White 
residents argued that they were being unfairly discriminated on the basis of 
race. While this was indirect discrimination, the court concluded that it was 
not unfair. The Council had the constitutional mandate of equalizing facili-
ties and services to all within its region. The facilities in the townships were 
vastly inferior to that of ‘white Pretoria.’ The white residents, although a 
political minority, were not victims of past patterns of discrimination. In the 
circumstances, the Court held that it was not unfair to adopt the differential 
tariff scheme as an interim measure until facilities were equalized. Walker 
alerted South Africans to the possibility that, in realizing the objective of 
achieving substantive equality, differently situated persons might be treated 
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differently. Walker determined that this Constitution was neither blind to 
color, nor the legacy of apartheid.  
In 2004, Minister of Finance v. Van Heerden, the court clarified the rela-
tionship between affirmative action, the attainment of substantive equality, 
and unfair discrimination. The Court held that remedial and restitutionary 
equality were integral to the achievement of substantive equality. In other 
words, “the provisions of section 9(1) and section 9(2) are complimentary; 
both contribute to the constitutional goal of achieving equality to ensure 
‘full and equal enjoyment of all rights.’ ” Courts assess remedial and af-
firmative action measures through the criteria in Van Heerden: For a 
categorization to amount to a constitutionally permissible affirmative action 
measure, it must target persons, or categories of persons, who have been 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, be designed to protect or advance 
such persons, and promote the achievement of equality. The inherent flexi-
bility of these criteria and the need to be context-sensitive could mean that 
the rigor and robustness with which these criteria are applied would depend 
on the extent to which the right to dignity has been affected by the categori-
zation. 
IV. Conclusion 
In the United States, the category of differentiation determines the level 
of scrutiny to which the conduct or law is subject. These levels range from 
the rational basis test, to the intermediate level of scrutiny, and, finally, to 
strict scrutiny analysis. The category of differentiation is often determinative 
of the outcome of the matter. South Africa, however, has adopted a more 
nuanced approach. Categorizations that do not impact dignity fall under the 
mere differentiation standard, or rationality standard, of section 9(1). Cate-
gorizations that impact dignity fall under a section 9(3) analysis.  
The level of scrutiny to determine whether measures fall within sec-
tion 9(2) is flexible, as opposed to being an intermediate standard between 
the non-exacting requirements of section 9(1) and the more exacting re-
quirements of section 9(3). As pointed out in Van Heerden, if a measure falls 
within section 9(2), it will not, in most instances, amount to unfair discrimi-
nation. Thus, if section 9(2) permits a measure, that measure is insulated 
from a challenge on the basis of unfair discrimination in terms of sec-
tion 9(3). It would be incongruent to have a measure sanctioned in one 
section of the Constitution, yet prohibited in the next. 
Recently, courts have more clearly connected the right to equality with 
that of human dignity and the realization of socio-economic rights. Denying 
social benefits to permanent residents is now deemed to be both unfair dis-
crimination on the basis of citizenship and an unreasonable denial of the 
right to social security. After a cautious start, the Court is prepared to inter-
pret section 9 more expansively in order to obtain substantive equality. 
Looking forward, it is probable that the right to equality will feature more 
prominently in applications claiming greater access to socio-economic 
rights. 
